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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This Note was not originally about Equifax. I decided to write a Note about 
Data Breach Litigation during my 1L summer internship, after working on the 
early stages of a putative class action lawsuit against a healthcare provider.  The 
breach involved compromising the personally identifiable information (PII)—
including sensitive medical information—of as many as 531,000 people.  At the 
time, I thought that was a lot. 
The project ended up occupying a fair amount of my time that summer, and 
by the time classes started back I thought I had something of a pet theory for 
stating a common law claim for negligent data security.  This Note will make the 
case for that theory. 
Then Equifax.  In early September, news broke that Equifax had been the 
victim of one of the largest data breaches ever recorded.1  The breach, Equifax 
told us, compromised the personally identifiable information of as many as 143 
million Americans—nearly half the adult population of the United States.2  
Perhaps most striking was CNN’s report that 
[u]nlike other data breaches, not all of the people affected by the Equifax 
breach may be aware that they’re customers of the company.  Equifax gets its 
data from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and lenders who report on the 
credit activity of individuals to credit reporting agencies, as well as by purchasing 
public records.3 
It wasn’t long before I would tell a classmate, a professor, or a friend about 
my Note topic, and they would reply, “Oh cool, so you’re writing about 
Equifax?”  And so it was—my Note was swept up in the breach.  Fine. I guess 
I’m writing about Equifax. 
But, in reality, there is more than that at stake here.  What I fear will escape 
notice is that, depending on who you ask, Equifax isn’t even the largest recorded 
data breach,4 and it certainly wasn’t the only one this year.  Said another way, this 
was not a one-off event.  Years before the Equifax breach, data from the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services noted 1,059 breaches impacting 
 
 1 Sarah Ashely O’Brien, Giant Equifax data breach: 143 million people could be affected, (Sept. 8, 
2017, 9:23 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/business/equifax-data-breach/index.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Mark Fahey, Yahoo data breach is among the biggest in history (Sept. 22, 2016, 3:09 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/22/yahoo-data-breach-is-among-the-biggest-in-
history.html. 
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close to 32 million individuals.5  In 2017 alone, Yahoo, Uber, Verizon, and 
NetProspex all suffered breaches affecting no less than 14 million people—
each.6 
Even before news of the Equifax Breach broke, data security concerns were 
becoming more common and more pressing.  “In the course of our everyday 
activities, we routinely reveal our names, addresses, and social security numbers 
as well as our financial decisions, health problems, tastes, habits, political and 
religious affiliations, sexual orientation, hobbies, and love affairs.”7  Some such 
transactions are unavoidable, like healthcare, insurance, employment and 
taxation, and even benefits and entitlements.  The frightening reality is that once 
the information is conveyed, one loses the ability to ensure its security. 
Certainly, steps can be taken to protect oneself against identity theft and 
related harm—but no system is foolproof.  Moreover, even to the extent such 
harm can be remedied, it is not difficult to imagine contexts in which a credit 
freeze or similar circumstances can cause meaningful harm by hobbling a 
person’s ability to make large scale and important purchases.  The more 
immediate impact, however, is seen in the estimated $4.1 billion consumers 
would end up paying to freeze their credit.8 
The other side of the data-breach coin is that commercial entities collecting 
and storing large quantities of PII face a constant threat of criminal hacking to 
steal and sell customer PII on the black market.9  Estimates placed Equifax’s 
losses from the breach between $200 and $300 million by Christmas 2017.10 
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to monetarily gauge what is, without a doubt, 
an unprecedented loss of consumer confidence in corporate information 
storage.11 
Where there is a loss, there is a lawsuit.  On September 11th, 2017, less than 
a week after the breach was announced, Reuters reported that more than thirty 
lawsuits had already been filed.12  It appears that dozens more were filed in 
 
 5 Eduard Goodman, The Equifax Data Breach And Its Impact On Businesses (Sept. 14, 2017, 
2:36PM),https://www.law360.com/articles/963870/the-equifax-data-breach-and-its-impact-
on-businesses.  
 6 Robin Kurzer, Equifax and beyond: How data breaches shaped 2017 (Dec, 21, 2017, 10:30 AM), 
https://marketingland.com/equifax-beyond-data-breaches-shaped-2017-230569. 
 7 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 381 (2003). 
 8 Kurzer, supra note 6. 
 9 See generally Monique C.M. Leahy, Litigation of Data Breach, 140 Am. Jur. Trials 327 § 1, 
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018). 
 10 Kurzer, supra note 6. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Reuters Staff, Lawsuits against Equifax pile up after massive data breach (Sept. 11, 2017, 2:52 
PM),https://www.reuters.com/article/us-equifax-cyber-lawsuits/lawsuits-against-equifax-
pile-up-after-massive-data-breach-idUSKCN1BM2E3. 
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subsequent weeks,13 but exact numbers are difficult to estimate amid 
consolidations, venue changes, voluntary dismissals, and suits against Equifax 
unrelated to the breach.  Most of these are still in the early stages as this Note is 
being revised in early January 2018.  These include individuals, financial 
institutions,14 and even the City of San Francisco.15 
While most states have statutes that require consumer notification of a data 
breach,16 many do not yet have statutes directly governing data security 
practices.17  In the absence of an overarching framework, the problem that 
presents itself is that a multi and cross-jurisdictional problem is treated in vastly 
different ways, and sometimes not addressed at all.  This uncertainty creates 
numerous problems in a commercial world based more and more on the 
collection, sale, and storage of PII. 
For one thing, victims of PII theft due to negligent security are often left 
largely without remedy.18  Credit monitoring is generally “the universal ‘band aid’ 
offered to consumers,”19 but it is by no means a complete solution.  For one 
thing, credit monitoring only detects credit fraud—not the scores of other 
vehicles for fraud using PII—and it lasts for a finite amount of time.20  As one 
senior industry analyst put it, “[b]ad guys can be very patient, so it’s important to 
keep an eye out long after this story fades from the headlines.”21 
Conversely, holders of PII can face tremendous uncertainty with respect to 
their responsibility to safeguard information across jurisdictions, even in 
neighboring states.22  The nature and scope of statutory duties differ, in turn 
 
 13 Renae Merle, After the breach, Equifax now faces the lawsuits (Sept. 22, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/22/after-the-breach-equifax-now-
faces-the-lawsuits/?utm_term=.07345eb72908 
 14 See id. 
 15 CBS News, Equifax hit with first lawsuit by U.S. city over data breach (Sept. 26, 2017, 3:29 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/equifax-data-breach-lawsuit-by-us-city/. 
 16 2018 Security Breach Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 27, 
2018),http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology 
/2018-Security-breach-legislation.aspx. 
 17 See Cybersecurity Legislation 2017, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 29, 
2017),http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
cybersecurity-legislation-2017.aspx. 
 18 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 7 (asserting that a lack of demonstrable injury often limits the 
ability of plaintiffs to bring suit). 
 19 Litigation of Data Breach supra note 9, § 7 Harm or injury required: credit monitoring. 
 20 See, e.g., Robert Harrow, What For-Pay Credit Monitoring Services Actually Offer, FORBES (Sept. 
25, 2017, 10:19 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertharrow/2017/09/25/what-for-
pay-credit-monitoring-services-actually-offer/ (discussing features of credit monitoring). 
 21 O’Brien, supra note 1. 
 22 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (demonstrating the patchwork nature of state statutes 
governing data breaches). 
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/3
SKEDSVOLD (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:43 PM 
2018] A DUTY TO SAFEGUARD 205 
requiring complicated compliance regimes.23  Even before the Equifax breach, 
the “patchwork” of federal and state laws and regulations governing data security 
was “generating more interest than ever” as businesses that store consumer 
information wondered “how these developments should impact their data 
security practices.”24 
This note argues that litigants and courts should conceptualize a duty to 
safeguard PII under a bailment theory.  Despite the relative novelty of the factual 
scenario, recognizing such a duty is simply a question of applying firmly 
established common law principles.  The first such principle is the intangible 
property rights a person holds with respect to their PII.  By definition, such 
information is specific to the individual and is widely recognized as being for the 
beneficial use of that individual as a participant in society.  Next, although PII is 
not a tangible “thing,” and certainly not a single “thing,” the trust involved in 
giving it over to another party in order to facilitate the exchange of money for 
goods or services is reminiscent of a common law bailment for mutual benefit.  
Finally, age old principles of property law establish a duty of reasonable care with 
respect to the object—the breach of which gives rise to a cause of action for 
negligent data security. 
Part II of this Note will discuss the background of data security litigation, 
including state and federal statutory duties, the gaps and problems associated 
with inconsistent treatment among these authorities, and the common law 
principles involved in asserting a duty to safeguard.  Part III of this Note will 
analyze the rights individuals have in their personally identifiable information and 
the dynamics of the commercial bailment relationship created by the exchange 
of PII.  Part IV will conclude by arguing that courts and litigants should 
conceptualize the standard cause of action for negligent data security under a 
quasi-bailment theory. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Relatively speaking, litigation of data breaches as such is still in its infancy.  
Thus, 
[d]espite this groundswell of potential claimants, there is no 
single set of laws setting forth the legal duty of care or the bases 
for civil liability in data breach settings.  Consequently, aggrieved 
 
 23 See id. (“The applicability of state and federal statutes depends on such factors as the type 
of data, where the data is stored, how it is stored, and who stores it.  As a result, data security 
practices may be subject to distinct but overlapping statutory requirements.”). 
 24 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (quoting Rosenfeld & McDowell, Moving Target: Protecting 
Against Data Breaches Now and Down the Road, 28-SUM Antitrust 90 (2014)). 
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individuals and their attorneys have been forced to resort to a 
patchwork of common law and state or federal statutory claims.25 
A. THE TYPICAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
The resulting “patchwork” has worked itself out such that, at present, data 
breach litigation takes place on one of four planes:  
 
I. Shareholder derivative lawsuits, 
II. Securities fraud class actions, 
III. Enforcement actions by governmental agencies, and 
IV. Class action lawsuits by breached companies’ customers or business  
partners.26 
 
1. Shareholder Derivative Suits.  Shareholder derivative actions appear in the 
cybersecurity/data breach context through allegations that management failed to 
take adequate precautions to guard against a data breach.27  Shareholders 
pursuing these sorts of derivative actions face numerous challenges, including 
the requirement that they first make a demand on the corporation to file suit, 
and the judicial presumption that the decision not to do so was reasonable and 
made in good faith.28  For example, Target shareholders saw their consolidated 
derivative suits find such an end in March 2016, after the company’s appointed 
special litigation committee (SLC) concluded that it would not be in Target’s best 
interest to pursue claims against the named officers and directors.29  The 
shareholders stipulated to dismissal of the case in accordance with the SLC’s 
guidelines in exchange for the right to seek attorney’s fees.30 
2.  Securities Fraud Class Actions.  Securities fraud class-action lawsuits have also 
served as a tool to recover for diminution in stock values following a cyber-
breach.31  In this context, shareholders might claim that they relied to their 
detriment on a company’s material misrepresentations regarding data privacy or 
security and readiness, usually made in public statements, press releases, or the 
 
 25 Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now You’re Being Sued: The Developing 
World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. BAR J., July/August 2016 30, 31. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 31–32. 
 28 See, e.g., Palkon v. Holmes, 2014 WL 5341880 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2014) (dismissing a 
derivative suit filed against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation involving the theft of over 
619,000 payment card numbers, finding the board’s decision to reject the shareholder’s 
demand to sue under the business judgement rule’s presumption). 
 29 Ronald W. Breaux et al., Target Data Breach Derivative Suit Dismissed, HAYNES BOONE (July 
19,2016), http://www.haynesboone.com/alerts/target-data-breach-derivative-suit-dismissed. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25. 
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corporation’s Form 10-K reports.32  Damages in this context manifest as a 
reduction in stock value, usually with the requirement by courts that there be a 
“statistically significant” decline in stock price.33  In one of the earliest data 
breach lawsuits filed, plaintiff shareholders sued Heartland Payment Systems, 
Inc. in 2007 regarding a data breach impacting 130 million credit and debit card 
numbers.34  Although Heartland’s stock price fell almost eighty percent, and the 
plaintiffs alleged that the company had hidden the attack on its network and 
overstated its preparedness, the court dismissed the lawsuit.35  The court held 
that Heartland’s failure to disclose the prior cyber-attack was not a material 
omission, and the mere fact that the system had been infiltrated before did not 
necessarily mean the referenced public statements were false.36 
3.  Governmental Enforcement Actions.  Federal agencies have also “gotten into 
the cybersecurity mix.”37  In 2014, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) released a Cybersecurity Framework,38 which is widely 
considered to be the leading federal authority for cybersecurity guidance.39  
However, the Framework and related guidance are nonbinding, and provide no 
enforcement mechanism.40  Thus, several other federal agencies have become 
active in litigating data breach issues, including the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).41 
These agencies typically rely on statutory and regulatory authority not 
intended for data breach litigation.  In recent years, the SEC has taken steps 
toward pursuing more enforcement actions like regulations containing a 
 
 32 Id. at 32. 
 33 See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 3461 (PAC), 2015 WL 5613150 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Arkansas Teachers Retirement Sys. 
v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 879 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that defendants failed to 
show a complete lack of price impact due to their inability to show that the decline in stock 
price was attributable only to the market reaction to the announcement of enforcement 
actions, and not due to the material misrepresentations made). 
 34 In Re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 09-1043, 2009 WL 4798148, at *1 
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 2009). 
 35 Id. at *1, *8. 
 36 Id.  at *7–8. 
 37 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 37 (noting that these initiatives have encountered “stiff 
resistance” due to the absence of overarching federal regulation to regulate cybersecurity, and 
the lack of a uniform standard for private-sector cybersecurity). 
 38 National Institute of Standards & Technology, NIST Releases Cybersecurity Framework 
Version 1.0 (Feb. 12, 2014), http://nist.gov/itl/csd/launch-cybersecurity-framework-021214.cfm. 
 39 See id. (discussing the framework and collaboration throughout the industry); Hooker & 
Pill, supra note 25, at 37. 
 40 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 37–38 (but noting that “some commentators believe the 
Framework may create a de facto legal standard that ultimately is applied by the courts”). 
 41 Id. at 38. 
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“safeguards rule,” requiring covered entities to adopt reasonable procedures for 
the protection of client records and information.42 
The FTC has been even more active, bringing more than fifty enforcement 
proceedings relating to data security in recent years.43  Recently, the FTC has 
filed lawsuits in federal court under its authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive 
trade acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.44  In F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., for example, the Third 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that differences between Wyndham’s 
policies and practices were sufficient to support a claim under the FTCA, holding 
that the FTC has authority to regulate “unfair” cybersecurity failures under 
§ 45.45  The Court reasoned that the FTCA, along with Wyndham’s prior data 
breach issues, provided sufficient notice of pertinent data breach standards.46 
4.  Consumer Class Actions.  Finally, and most relevant to this Note, consumer 
class actions have continued  to take shape as a form of data-breach litigation.47  
As previously noted, these actions have been asserted under statutory claims with 
greater and greater frequency.48  Usage of statutory bases for suit have been 
numerous and varied, ranging from state statutes on point all the way to older 
state and federal statutes addressed toward unrelated subject matter.49  Where 
statutory authority is unavailable, or simply unsuccessful, plaintiffs have turned 
to a number  of common law theories.50 
Some federal statutes address themselves toward data privacy and security, 
but even the few that codify a duty to safeguard are extremely limited in scope.51  
For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions to 
protect consumers’ nonpublic personal information, including the prevention of 
disclosure to unauthorized third parties.52  However, courts have generally been 
unwilling to hold that other entities, like health care providers, meet the statutory 
criteria to be a “financial institution.”53  Along the same lines, the Fair Credit 
 
 42 See 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2005); R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Proceeding No. 3-
16827 (bringing charges against public companies for failure to protect the PII of customers 
and clients who were the victims of criminal hacking). 
 43 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 
957–58 (2016). 
 44 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018). 
 45 F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 46 Id. at 258–59. 
 47 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 34 (also considering claims by financial institutions doing 
business with defendant companies). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 31. 
 51 Id. at 36. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id.; see also Leahy, supra note 9, § 3 (illustrating the distinction between financial 
institutions and health care providers). 
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Reporting Act requires consumer reporting agencies to, among other things, 
safely dispose of consumer information and maintain reasonable procedures to 
avoid its disclosure.54   
Interestingly, plaintiffs have also attempted to make use of federal statutes 
not aimed directly at data breach.55  Negligence per se claims under HIPAA, for 
example, have achieved mixed results. In Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, the 
Ohio Court of Appeals held that a negligence per se action under HIPAA “is no 
less than a private action to enforce HIPAA, which is precluded.”56  Conversely, 
in Smith v. Triad of Ala., the court allowed the plaintiff to pursue a negligence per 
se action based on HIPAA based on Alabama case law “indicat[ing] Alabama 
courts’ willingness to allow statutes that do not otherwise provide private causes 
of action to serve as the basis for a negligence per se claim. . . .”57 
At the state level, numerous statutes have been targeted toward the duty to 
safeguard PII, for example: 
       
Arkansas 
Personal 
Information 
Protection Act 
“A person or business that acquires, owns, or licenses personal information 
about an Arkansas resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to 
protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure.”58 
California “It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that personal information about 
California residents is protected. . . .  A business that owns, licenses, or 
maintains personal information about a California resident shall implement and 
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature 
of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized 
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”59 
 
 54 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 36. 
 55 See, e.g., Complaint at 25–26, Wexler v. Peachtree Orthopaedic Clinic, No. 
2016CV284076 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2016) (alleging negligence per se under § 45 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
 56 40 N.E.3d 661, 674 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015). 
 57 No. 1:14–CV–324–WKW, 2015 WL 5793318, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015). 
 58 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4–110–104(b) (2005). 
 59 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(a)(i), (b) (West/Deering 2004). 
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Florida “[e]ach covered entity, governmental entity, or third-party agent shall take 
reasonable measures to protect and secure data in electronic form containing 
personal information.”60 
Maryland 
Personal 
Information 
Protection Act 
“To protect personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification, 
or disclosure, a business that owns or licenses personal information of an 
individual residing in the State shall implement and maintain reasonable 
security procedures and practices that are appropriate to the nature of the 
personal information owned or licensed and the nature and size of the business 
and its operations.”61 
Maryland State 
Government 
Laws 
A State government unit “that collects personal information of an individual 
shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices that 
are appropriate to the nature of the personal information collected and the 
nature of the unit and its operations [to protect personal information from 
unauthorized access, use, modification, or disclosure].”62 
Nevada “A data collector that maintains records which contain personal information of 
a resident of this State shall implement and maintain reasonable security 
measures to protect those records from unauthorized access, acquisition, 
destruction, use, modification or disclosure.”63 
Rhode Island 
Identity Theft 
Protection Act 
of 2015 
“A municipal agency, state agency or person that stores, collects, processes, 
maintains, acquires, uses, owns or licenses personal information about a Rhode 
Island resident shall implement and maintain a risk-based information security 
program that contains reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate 
to the size and scope of the organization; the nature of the information; and 
the purpose for which the information was collected in order to protect the 
personal information from unauthorized access, use, modification, destruction, 
or disclosure and to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
such information.”64 
 
Finally, consumer class action suits have relied on a variety of common law 
bases.65  Theories include negligent misrepresentation, contractual duty, 
 
 60 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171(2) (West/LexisNexis 2014). 
 61 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14–3503 (2018). 
 62 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10–1304 (2018). 
 63 NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.210(1) (2018). 
 64 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–49.3–2(a) (2015). 
 65 Hooker & Pill, supra note 25, at 34. 
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equitable theories, and, of course, common law negligence.66  Each of these first 
four theories faces procedural challenges that—although there may be isolated 
situations in which a claim is viable—make them of little help to the bulk of 
plaintiffs.  Negligent misrepresentation claims, for example, require overt 
representations by a defendant that they “would take reasonable measures to 
protect the plaintiff’s information.”67  Even where a plaintiff can show such a 
representation, defendants can escape these claims by demonstrating reliance on 
the representation was not justified.68  Similarly, it has been difficult to establish 
even implied contractual agreements to safeguard PII,69 particularly where the 
parties do not share a direct relationship.70 
In at least one case, a court has accepted equitable theories like unjust 
enrichment as stating a claim for recovery of damages related to a data breach.  
Among the theories surviving the motion to dismiss in In re Target Corp. Customer 
Data Security Breach Litigation71 was the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment “would not 
have shopped” theory.72  The Target court held that 
[i]f Plaintiffs [could] establish that they shopped at Target after 
Target knew or should have known of the breach, and that 
Plaintiffs would not have shopped at Target had they known 
about the breach, a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
money Plaintiffs spent at Target is money to which Target “in 
equity and good conscience” should not have received.73 
The court did, however, reject the plaintiffs’ “overcharge” theory, reasoning 
that the plaintiffs could not plausibly allege that they had been overcharged to 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See, e.g., In re Heartland Payment Sys’s Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 
2d 566, 590 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim for 
failure to prove reliance was reasonable), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Lone Star Nat. 
Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys’s, Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (interpreting New 
Jersey law and reversing and remanding on plaintiffs negligence claim). 
 69 See, e.g., Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012) (alleging, inter alia, 
a breach of a contract to provide healthcare by allowing unauthorized access to medical 
information); In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 
108, 118 (D. Me. 2009) (alleging breach of a contract to protect customer’s debit card 
information implied in a contract for the sale of goods), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. 
Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 70 See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(pmb)(RLE), 2010 
WL 2643307, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010). 
 71 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 72 Id. at 1178. 
 73 Id. 
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offset the costs of data security since cash customers paid the same price and 
faced no risk of PII theft.74 
In recent years negligence has picked up speed as the theory of preference in 
consumer class actions.75 Even so, there appears to be relatively little exploration 
of the nature and source of the duty to safeguard. In some respects this is 
unsurprising, and yet even when a plaintiff can meet his burden to show breach, 
cause, and harm, the question of whether and why a defendant has the duty to 
safeguard has proved to be surprisingly recalcitrant.  There are a handful of 
possible explanations for the absence of discussion on the basis for a duty to 
safeguard. 
First and foremost—these cases are relatively new, and they are not 
inherently “high-dollar” claims.76 In terms of the development of the law, one 
might conclude there simply has not been enough time for appellate courts to 
hear and decide the issue. 
Second, in many cases the question is simply  not considered in great detail.  
For example, in 2014 the District Court for Minnesota considered numerous 
theories purporting to state a data breach claim, but, for the purposes of the 
motion, Target did not dispute that Plaintiffs had plausibly alleged the existence 
of a duty to safeguard. Instead, the company chose to argue that the plaintiffs 
had failed to allege any damages and that the negligence claims were barred by 
the economic loss rule.77 
Relatedly, and as Target illustrates, there are significant procedural hurdles to 
recovery that garner more attention from courts and litigants. Most notably, data 
breach plaintiffs have difficulty making adequate showings of standing and 
harm.78  Courts have often  held that data breach plaintiffs lacked  standing to 
sue because “no actual harm has occurred.”79  The typical reasoning in these 
cases is that damages are not recoverable on the mere possibility of identity theft 
because of the lack of proof of actual injury.80  Thus, arguments around standing 
and harm are typically the focus of dispositive motions and orders, so that 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 David Zetoony et. al., 2017 Data Breach Litigation Report: A comprehensive analysis of class 
action lawsuits involving data security breaches filed in United States District Courts, BRYAN CAVE 
LEIGHTON PAISNER (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bryancave.com/images/content/9/6/v2/
96690/Bryan-Cave-Data-Breach-Litigation-Report-2017-edition.pdf 
 76 See John P. Hutchins & Renard C. Francois, A New Frontier: Litigation over Data Breaches, 
20 No. 4 Prac. Litigator 47 (2009) (discussing the litigation landscape for data breaches). 
 77 In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 
2014). 
 78 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 7. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 496 
(Me. 2010) (finding that time and effort, spent to avoid or remedy foreseeable harm was not 
a cognizable injury for which damages could be recovered under the law of negligence). 
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relatively little thought is given to why holders of PII have a responsibility to 
safeguard it in the first place. 
B. THE QUASI-BAILMENT THEORY 
Interestingly, relatively few data-breach consumer plaintiffs have asserted 
claims based on bailment theories.81  With only minor variations in language 
across jurisdictions, the elements of a bailment are: 
(1) delivery of personal property by one person to another to be 
used for a specific purpose; 
(2) acceptance of such delivery; and 
(3) an express or implied contract that the purpose will be carried 
out and the property will then be returned or dealt with as 
otherwise directed.82 
This definition of a bailment under Texas state law largely tracks the language 
found in legal encyclopedias and practice manuals: 
A bailment is a contractual relationship, express or implied, 
which results from the delivery of personal property by one 
person . . . and an acceptance of the property by another . . . for 
the accomplishment of some purpose, beneficial to either the 
bailor or bailee or both, on the condition that, once the purpose 
has been fulfilled, the bailed property must either be redelivered 
to the bailor, kept until he reclaims it, or otherwise dealt with 
according to his directions.83 
Naturally, there are potential roadblocks to the use of a bailment theory in 
the data breach.  First and foremost, it is not immediately clear that PII is the 
type of “object,” if indeed it is an object, which might be the subject of a 
bailment.  Second, it is not obvious that “the shoe fits” for a bailment theory, 
since bailments typically require return of the bailed object. Third, questions 
might reasonably arise as to the very existence of an agreement, express or 
 
 81 See Zetoony, supra note 75 (charting the statistical breakdown of theories utilized by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys in data breach litigation complaints, and showing that only 18% of 
complaints include a bailment claim, compared to 95% including negligence claims) 
 82 Lynch Props. Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 83 Mark S. Dennison, Bailee’s Liability for Damage, Loss, or Theft of Bailed Property, 46 Am. Jur. 
Proof of Facts 3d 361, § 2: Creation of Bailment Contract; Delivery and Acceptance (updated 
Feb. 2018). 
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implied, giving rise to the bailment.  The data-breach case law evaluating the 
bailment theory reflects these concerns. 
Of the cases dealing with data breach litigation on a bailment theory, In re 
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation84 appears to have 
done so in the most detail.  The court identified three failings in the bailment 
theory.  First, the plaintiffs alleged only that Sony failed to maintain reasonable 
data security, and thus “there [were] no allegations of conversion or any other 
intentional conduct by Sony that would indicate that Sony sought to unlawfully 
retain possession of Plaintiffs’ Personal Information.”85  Second, the court 
declared itself “hard pressed to conceive of how Plaintiffs’ Personal Information 
could be construed to be personal property so that Plaintiffs somehow ‘delivered’ 
this property to Sony and then expected it be returned,” and that, in any event, 
“if such a legal theory for bailment exists, Plaintiffs have failed to present the 
Court with such in its Opposition papers.”86  Finally, the court found the 
bailment claim duplicative of the claims for negligence and violation of California 
consumer protection statutes, such that “any damages Plaintiffs might be able to 
recover under this unorthodox claim for bailment would be recoverable under 
its negligence and/or consumer protection claim.”87 
Relying on Sony in part, the District Court for Minnesota found fault in the 
consumer-plaintiffs’ bailment claim in Target because “[e]ven if Plaintiffs are 
correct that intangible property such as their personal financial information can 
constitute property subject to bailment principles, they [did] not—and [could 
not]—allege that they and Target agreed that Target would return the property 
to them.”88 
Finally, the Court in Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co.89 considered the bailment issue 
only in sufficient detail to note that “courts in Pennsylvania have yet to consider 
whether such a claim could arise in connection with a loss of electronic 
information,” and agreed with the logic of Sony, Target, and Ruiz, on the belief 
that “Pennsylvania courts would do the same.”90 
Thus, courts have found four types of problems with bailment theories in the 
data breach context.  First, reasonable questions might be raised about the 
express or implied creation of the bailment relationship itself.  Second, some 
courts have expressed concern about whether PII is personal property for the 
purposes of being delivered and returned in a bailment relationship.  Third, 
 
 84 903 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 85 Id. at 974. 
 86 Id.; see also Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that 
social security numbers and credit card information stolen from a computer were not property 
for purposes of the law of bailment). 
 87 903 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75. 
 88 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1177. 
 89 136 F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 90 Id. at 679. 
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courts have shown a recurring concern with holding a bailee liable for breach of 
bailment when the damage is done by third-party criminal activity.  Finally, courts 
have expressed doubt about the bailment theory of data breach on the ground 
that PII cannot be “returned” in the ordinary sense of bailed objects, and 
therefore possession is not properly “temporary.”  Part III will analyze these and 
related issues involved in establishing a quasi-bailment theory giving rise to a duty 
to take reasonable care to safeguard PII.   
III. ANALYSIS 
Courts should conceptualize data breach litigation under the framework of a 
quasi-bailment theory.   
A bailment is a contractual relationship, express or implied, 
which results from the delivery [and acceptance] of personal 
property. . . for the accomplishment of some purpose, beneficial 
to either the bailor or bailee or both, on the condition that, once 
the purpose has been fulfilled, the bailed property must either be 
redelivered to the bailor, kept until he reclaims it, or otherwise 
dealt with according to his directions.91 
While negligence claims are the most common claim asserted in data breach 
cases,92 this theory of data breach largely fails to explain why the duty exists. By 
contrast, a bailment theory clearly explains why the duty exists, and thereby 
informs its parameters and the relevant inquiries. In this context, an implied 
bailment may be created via the delivery and acceptance of PII in a commercial 
exchange for the purpose of facilitating the exchange, creating a mutually 
beneficial relationship with the customarily implied condition that the PII will be 
used for the purposes of the relationship and safeguarded against theft.  While 
the PII may not be “returned” as such, the bailee deals with it according to 
implied instructions to use it as agreed, safeguard it, and subsequently store or 
dispose of it by reasonable means. 
A. INDIVIDUALS HAVE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN THEIR PII 
It should be noted at the outset what this argument is not: the argument is not 
that individuals own their personally identifiable information, at least not in any 
sense that involves exclusivity and exclusion.  What the argument is, is that 
individuals have a property interest in the security of their PII.  This is seen in 
both the theoretical underpinnings of property law and the current state of the 
 
 91 Dennison, supra note 94. 
 92 Zetoony, supra note 75 
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law today.  On a theoretical basis, common law utilitarian principles and Lockean 
theory support the assertion that individuals have an interest in their PII.  
Further, the law presently contains numerous positive protections of PII,93 all of 
which are consistent with an individual’s interests in their PII for the purposes 
of a bailment.   
1. Individuals clearly do not “own” their personally identifiable information.  
This much is clear from case law addressing claims that ownership of PII gives 
a person exclusionary rights to prevent information traders from dealing in PII 
itself.94  Such claims advance ownership and interest theories aimed at 
information privacy.  Along these lines, “[p]ractically all federal and state laws that 
address the issue of individual consent [to the collection of PII] apply the ‘opt-
out’ rule” requiring companies to allow individuals the opportunity to opt out of 
standard information practices, as opposed to the “opt-in” model, “which 
obligates companies to obtain express consumer consent before they can share 
or sell [customer PII].”95   
However, American law dealing with PII is “‘a patchwork of uneven, 
inconsistent, and often irrational’ federal and state rules.”96  Most such rules 
protecting individuals from dissemination of their personal information apply 
only to government entities,97 and the few federal regulations covering the 
transfer of PII in the private market are industry- and even situation-specific.98 
Importantly, “these regulations are not based on any uniform theory of rights.”99  
Thus, as clear as it is that individuals do not own their PII, it is equally clear that 
 
 93 See, e.g., Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of 
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383–84 (1996) (“[P]ersonal information [is] any data about an 
individual that is identifiable to that individual . . . .  Such information, like all information, is 
property.”). 
 94 See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting a 
subscriber’s claim for unauthorized sale of subscriber lists); see also U.S. News & World Report, 
Inc. v. Avhrami, No. 95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 518, at *16–17 (Va. Cir. June 13, 1996) 
(rejecting claims seeking to block unauthorized dissemination of PII based on a theory of 
misappropriation of one’s name because individuals do not have property rights in the names 
they use). 
 95 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 393. 
 96 See id. at 391 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 80 (1997)). 
 97 See id.; see, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (permitting individuals to 
determine which personal records are collected, maintained, or disseminated by federal 
agencies); see also Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–(2000) (providing 
procedural requirements for sharing financial information among federal agencies). 
 98 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 391–92; see, e.g., Fair Credit 
Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.S. 1681 (2002) (recognizing the individual’s right to privacy 
with regard to disclosure of credit records); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 3401–3404 (2002) (recognizing individual’s right to privacy with regard to disclosure of 
financial records by banks and governmental agencies). 
 99 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 392. 
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the law does not foreclose the possibility that individuals may have a property 
interest in the security of their PII. 
An individual’s property interests in PII security should not be foreclosed by 
these rules ,because the impetus behind most information privacy laws simply 
does not carry over.  Considering PII rights in reference to data security, it makes 
sense to recognize greater property interests. In the privacy context, the notion 
is that individuals have exclusionary rights to their PII, i.e., commercial entities may 
not disseminate the information without that person’s consent.100  At its heart, 
this is a pretty expansive claim.  Exclusionary rights over who may “possess” 
information like one’s name, home address, and date of birth would involve a 
level of control over information far and above even the most liberal rights of 
publicity.  Claims to property interests in PII for security purposes, however, are 
not nearly so expansive. 
2. More to the point, utilitarian principles would seem to support the 
assertion that individuals have an interest in the security of their sensitive PII.  
“Under the utilitarian theory, rights should be allocated so as to maximize human 
satisfaction or benefit.”101  In recent years, this has been interpreted to mean 
economic efficiency and the facilitation of wealth-maximizing transactions.102 
Unlike information privacy, it seems clear that the security of sensitive personal 
information is the more efficient outcome. 
By way of example, Judge Posner concluded in his article “The Right of 
Privacy” that the efficient outcome in the privacy context is to assign the 
property right to the seller of PII, rather than the individual.103 It is doubtful, 
however, that his rationale translates to the security context.  Judge Posner 
reasoned that, for purposes of company’s commercial use of consumer 
information, “the cost of obtaining the subscriber’s approval would be high 
relative to the low value of the list.”104 Although there is some dispute on the 
specifics of that claim,105 the logic itself appears to be sound.  This same logic 
does not apply, however, to PII in the security context.  Simply put, lax data 
security is almost certainly inefficient. 
 
 100 See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying 
Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECHN. 91 (2009) 
(examining the nature of data collection and dissemination). 
 101 Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 421, citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 
1 SELECT EXTRACTS FROM THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 33 (Thoemmes Press 1995) 
(1843). 
 102 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36–39, 271–89 (4th ed. 1992); 
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968). 
 103 Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See Bergelson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 421–22 (citing studies by 
Kenneth C. Laudon indicating the inefficiency involved with telemarketers and junk-mail). 
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Take the Equifax breach.  On September 7, 2017, Equifax announced it had 
suffered a massive breach that “compromised the personal information of as 
many as 143 million Americans—almost half the [adult population of the] 
country.”106  Examples of subsequent inefficiencies—be they temporal or 
monetary—are legion.  Equifax’s website and phone systems were apparently so 
heavily bogged down in the days and weeks after the breach that it was extremely 
difficult for affected persons to obtain information about the breach, determine 
whether or not they were affected, and find out what to do next.107  Apparently, 
Equifax’s responsiveness became so bad that people began to wonder if the 
company was deliberately obfuscating attempts to obtain credit freezes.108  
Equifax representatives eventually told reporters that the company was 
experiencing such a high volume of requests and communications that, on top 
of everything else, Equifax was experiencing technical difficulties in 
responding.109  Those customers that were able to get through to Equifax found 
that many representatives had outdated information about the breach, if they had 
any at all.110  This required Equifax to spend still more time and money training 
its troubleshooting team.111 
Even when customers were able to freeze their credit, many experienced 
difficulties in obtaining the PIN number necessary to unfreeze their credit later 
on.112  While Equifax maintained many of these issues were browser errors, the 
fact remained that it became necessary to set up mechanisms to verify identities 
by phone and generate new PINs, and even consider sending PINs via post mail 
instead.113 
It is axiomatic, on the other hand, that “[d]ata breaches are, at least to some 
degree, preventable” and “[t]o the extent they are not preventable, their effects 
can be mitigated by the way the company whose data is breached handles the 
breach.”114  FTC guidelines are instructive on this point: 
The Federal Trade Commission [has been] concerned with at least five 
inadequate data security practices:115 
 
 106 O’Brien, supra note 1. 
 107 Ron Lieber, Equifax Finally Responds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2017, at B1. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Leahy, supra note 9, § 2 (citing Dave Maxfield & Bill Latham, Data Breaches, 25 S.C. LAW. 
28, 30 (2014)). 
 115 Id. (citing Abraham Shaw, Note, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using PCI DSS, 
43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 558–59 (2010). 
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1. Inadequately assessing system vulnerability to commonly 
known or reasonably foreseeable attacks. 
2. Failing to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available 
defenses. 
3. Using default user ID or passwords to protect sensitive data 
rather than stronger passwords to prevent hackers. 
4. Storing information in unencrypted files and sending sensitive 
data via unencrypted transmission routes. 
5. Failing to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.  
While there is undoubtedly cost and time consumption associated with 
correcting these practices, it appears to be generally true that they are achievable 
within reason.  The salient detail, therefore, is that “[i]f not prevented or 
mitigated, data breaches can cause enormous harm and result in significant 
financial damages.”116 
On balance, therefore, negligent data security is inefficient, and utilitarian 
principles counsel imposing a duty to safeguard. 
3. More importantly still, the law confers or recognizes confidentiality rights 
in PII in numerous and varied contexts.  First, and most notably, HIPAA 
imposes strict confidentiality requirements on the use of a person’s medical 
information.117  Title II of HIPAA establishes policies and procedures for 
maintaining the privacy of health related PII.118  The HIPAA Privacy Rule 
regulates the use and disclosure of Protected Health Information held by 
“covered entities,” including employer sponsored health plans, health insurers, 
and medical service providers that engage in certain transactions.119  While 
covered entities may disclose information for law enforcement purposes or to 
facilitate treatment, payment, or health care operations, disclosures of Personal 
Health Information generally require written authorization from the individual 
for the disclosure.120 
Similarly, under the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH), the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) promoted and expanded the adoption of health 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. § 3 n.6. 
 118 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
August 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 1936. 
 119 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 160.103 (West 2018). 
 120 45 C.F.R. 164.502(a)(1)(iv). 
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information technology.121  In relevant part, the HITECH Act requires entities 
covered by the HIPAA to report data breaches which affect 500 or more persons 
to HHS, the news media, and persons affected by the data breaches.122 
Finally, the confidentiality interests established in HIPAA, the Code of 
Federal Regulations, and HITECH also find analogues at the state level in the 
many varieties of data-breach notification statutes mentioned above.123  Thus, in 
these types of statutes, the law already recognizes the existence of confidentiality 
and security interests in personally identifiable information. Based on these 
examples, it is not a stretch to conclude that PII may be the type of property that 
can be the object of a bailment. 
B. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PII MAY PLAUSIBLY INVOLVE A 
BAILMENT AGREEMENT 
While some courts have expressed concern about establishing the existence 
of a bailment agreement,124 commercial transactions involving PII commonly 
involve at least a plausible allegation of an implied bailment agreement.  For one 
thing, the public outcry routinely observable after a large-scale data breach 
suggests that the general public understands the commercial holder to have a 
duty of reasonable care.  More importantly, however, courts have begun to 
recognize that the realities of modern life imply a promise to safeguard PII.125 
In Daly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., for example, the Supreme Court of New 
York found that a purchaser of life insurance “was required to, and agreed to, 
supply Met Life with highly sensitive personal information including her full 
name, her Social Security number, and her date of birth,” concluding “[i]mplicit 
in this agreement was a covenant to safeguard this information.”126  The court 
explained: 
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is that, in order to obtain a life 
insurance policy, Ms. Daly had to provide sensitive personal 
information for herself and for her father. Met Life represented 
that this information would be protected and would remain fully 
 
 121 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final 
Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/hitech-act-enforcement-
interim-final-rule/index.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e) (2010). 
 123 See supra text accompanying notes 58–71. 
 124 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 125 See 4 Misc. 3d 887, 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004); see also Jones v. Commerce Bancorp, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32067 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006). 
 126 4 Misc. 3d 887, 893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2004). 
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confidential. Relying on that promise, Ms. Daly released her 
personal information.127 
This summary explains the paradox of refusing to recognize a duty to 
safeguard under the quasi-bailment theory: people engage in numerous PII-
dependent transactions every day, many of them realistically less optional than 
the decision to purchase life insurance, which require them to trust another 
person with their PII. Common experience would seem to reflect that consumers 
and commercial entities understand there to be an implied covenant to keep the 
data secure. 
Thus, the Daly court noted, “[p]laintiffs’ claims are similar to those seen in 
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality.”128  The court 
further explained that, within the doctor-patient relationship, this duty comes 
“not . . . from a statutory right . . . [but] from ‘the implied covenant of trust and 
confidence that is inherent in the physician patient relationship. . . .’”129  And, 
indeed, “[a] similar covenant of trust and confidence may be inferred in business 
dealings.”130  The court concluded that “this concept has never before been 
applied to issues surrounding the protection of confidential personal 
information, [but] perhaps in the absence of appropriate legislative action, it 
should.”131 
It should.  Both customers and businesses undoubtedly recognize the gravity 
of a data breach and the harm that flows from it.  And it is entirely plausible that, 
in light of this reality, under some circumstances this understanding takes the 
next step into being an implied promise to keep and use PII safely, within reason. 
The substance of the agreement, moreover, need not be excruciatingly 
explicit to be discernible.  On its own terms, a bailment for mutual benefit 
requires only that the bailee exercise reasonable care in safeguarding the object 
of the bailment.132  While “reasonable” data security is undoubtedly a fact 
specific question, there are certainly reasonable starting points available in the 
data-breach literature: 
Security failures resulting in loss of data include: 
(a)Failing to establish or enforce rules sufficient to make user 
credentials hard to guess.  For example, customers may be 
allowed to use the same word, including common dictionary 
 
 127 Id. at 892. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Dennison, supra note 83, §§ 4–5. 
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words, as both the password and user ID, or a close variant of 
the user ID as the password. 
(b)Permitting the sharing of user credentials among a customer’s 
multiple users, thus reducing likely detection of, and 
accountability for, unauthorized data searches. 
(c)Failing to require periodic changes of user credentials, such as 
every 90 days, for customers with access to sensitive, nonpublic 
information. 
(d)Failing to suspend user credentials after a certain number of 
unsuccessful log-in attempts. 
(e)Allowing customers to store their user credentials in a 
vulnerable format in cookies on their computers. 
(f) Failing to require customers to encrypt or otherwise protect 
credentials, search queries, and/or search results in transit 
between customer computers and Web sites. 
(g)Allowing customers to create new credentials without 
confirming that the new credentials were created by the 
customers rather than identity thieves. 
(h)Failing to adequately assess the vulnerability of the web 
application and computer network for commonly known or 
reasonably foreseeable attacks. 
(i)Failing to implement simple, low-cost, and readily available 
defenses to these attacks.133 
The virtue of this approach is threefold.  First, the analysis lends itself to 
flexible application to the varying size of PII holders, the amount of information 
they store, and even the range of PII involved in their business.  Second, while a 
“reasonable care” standard does not provide quantifiable clarity in data security 
standards, it imposes a framework that is familiar to corporate litigants, 
conducive to presenting defenses to liability in court, and will foster consistency 
across jurisdictions. Finally, a duty to safeguard based on a bailment theory does 
not automatically equate the possession of another’s PII with the duty to 
 
 133 See Leahy, supra note 9, § 2 (citing NIMMER & TOWLE, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS § 16.06(1)(B)). 
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safeguard it; instead, it offers a workable framework for rendering consistent 
decisions on when the duty exists and how far it goes. In this sense, the bailment 
theory is a preferable alternative to other proposed regimes.134 
C. PROTECTING PII AGAINST THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL ACCESS FALLS WITHIN 
THE SCOPE OF THE IMPLIED BAILMENT AGREEMENT 
Fundamentally, the duty of care under a bailment theory includes 
“safeguarding the bailor’s property . . . for any damage, loss or theft proximately 
caused by his lack of reasonable care.135 There is no particular reason this should 
not apply to data breach litigation, and numerous reasons it should. 
To begin with, the analogy plays.  It is universally true in bailment law that 
the nature of “reasonable” care requires analysis on a case-by-case basis.136  This 
is no less true in data breach than with regard to tangible objects.  In the bailment 
of tangible objects, a good example might be the theft of a bailed vehicle from a 
bailee’s parking lot.  In that case, relevant considerations include factors like 
whether there were enough parking lot attendants on duty or whether it was 
reasonable to leave the vehicle unlocked with the keys inside.137 
It is not difficult to analogize the parking lot to a server, nor PII to the cars.  
Granted, the functionality of the exchange is not a perfect match—but it doesn’t 
have to be.  The purpose of the analogy is to show that data security may also be 
unreasonable if it lacks “enough parking lot attendants,” i.e., “inadequately 
assess[es] system vulnerability to . . . reasonably foreseeable attacks,” or “fail[s] 
to apply low-cost, simple, and readily available defenses,”138 or else “leaves the 
keys in an unlocked car,” i.e., “stor[es] information in unencrypted files,” or 
“fail[s] to develop unauthorized access detection mechanisms.”139 
In the context of these commercial relationships built on PII, the very nature 
of an implied bailment agreement is that an individual gives over control of their 
information (or at least that compilation of it) to a commercial entity in order to 
obtain services with the understanding that it will be used for that purpose and 
 
 134 Contra John A. Fisher, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Consumer Remedy for The Negligent 
Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215 (2013). 
 135 See Dennison, supra note 83, § 11. 
 136 See id. 
 137 Id. (citing Allright Parking System, Inc. v. Deniger, 508 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 
Eastland 1974) (“[F]inding that bailee did not exercise reasonable care to protect bailor’s car 
against theft because parking lot was not attended by an adequate and prudent number of 
employees.”); Schulze v. Allison, 204 Okla. 147, 227 P.2d 658 (1950) (“[F]inding that bailee 
failed to use reasonable care to protect bailed vehicle from theft where single attendant on 
duty was required to park and deliver cars of customers from connecting parking lots and left 
keys in ignition.”). 
 138 Leahy, supra note 9, § 2. 
 139 Id. 
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protected against others.  The implied bailment agreement itself centers around 
the protection of PII against unauthorized access. 
D. WHILE A BAILEE CANNOT “RETURN” PII IN THE ORDINARY SENSE, THE 
BAILEE RETAINS OR DISPOSES OF THE PII ACCORDING TO CONDITIONS OF 
THE BAILMENT IMPLIED IN CUSTOM 
Admittedly, a bailee cannot “return” PII in the customary sense of presenting 
the bailor with the object and relinquishing its control to the bailor.  However, 
this cannot defeat a quasi-bailment of PII because, as noted above, a bailee must 
either return the bailed property to the bailor, or dispose of it according to his 
instructions.140 
It is worth reiterating that the principle concern of returning a bailed object 
to the bailor is not any rigid or formalistic concern for technicality, but rather 
clearly demonstrating that the object in question is bailed—rather than given.  The 
guiding principle in a quasi-bailment, therefore, should be some similar 
requirement that the original conveyance does not pass title nor surrender the 
property.  This is clearly met in the PII context. 
Firstly, conveyance of PII to the bailee clearly does not sever the bailor’s 
interest, because in every instance the bailor’s confidentiality interest in the PII 
remains unchanged.  The bailor has in no sense passed title or otherwise 
relinquished his interest in his personally identifiable information.  Any such 
suggestion would be absurd—notice statutes, confidentiality requirements, and 
the broader world of privacy and nondisclosure operate where a person or entity 
holds another person’s PII. 
Similarly, the nature of the transaction is such that the bailee has clear, 
although implied, instructions as to how to handle PII.  Namely, it is reasonable 
to say that customary usage of PII establishes the parties’ shared expectation that, 
during the course of the relationship, the bailee is to use the information for the 
agreed purpose, reasonably protect it against unauthorized access, and return it 
thereafter or dispose of it according to customary practice. In this sense, the 
implied instructions as to the PII may be thought of in one of two ways: an 
indefinite bailment or a bailment ending upon safe disposal. 
In the first alternative, the bailment may simply be thought of as lasting for 
an indefinite term.  While the concept is admittedly somewhat novel, it makes 
sense in the PII context in a way it simply could not with tangible objects.  A 
tangible object must be returned within some definable length of time, or for all 
intents and purposes it effectively becomes the property of the bailee.  Not so 
with PII.  No matter how long a data collector, retailer, or healthcare provider 
stores PII, it never becomes any less personal to the bailor, and his interest in it 
does not diminish until his death.  Further, because the bailee must also store 
 
 140 See Dennison, supra note 83. 
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and protect the information of present customers, it might not unreasonably 
heighten the burden of the bailee to be held to his agreement. 
Conversely, the bailment may also be terminated upon the safe disposal of 
the information.  In the paper era of information storage, at some point it became 
necessary to physically dispose of older records no longer in use.  While storage 
capacities for digital information exponentially exceed the capabilities of paper 
storage, companies may choose to dispose of non-current records for any 
number of reasons.  Once a bailee safely wipes the information from his digital 
records, he is absolved of any duty to safeguard that particular manifestation of 
PII.  And again, disposal of the information instead of per se “return” does 
nothing to diminish the bailor’s interests in or value derived from PII, so the 
purposes of temporary conveyance are served. 
Thus, plaintiffs in data breach cases might plausibly state a claim for negligent 
data security under a quasi-bailment theory. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If recent experience has taught us anything, it is that data breach concerns are 
likely to become more pressing, not less.  The patchwork legal framework for 
imposing varying duties under varying circumstances across state lines not only 
deprives plaintiffs of a remedy, but imposes complicated compliance regimes for 
commercial PII holders.  
At bottom, the thrust of this Note is this: quasi-bailment theories imposing a 
duty to safeguard PII may state a claim sufficient to surpass a motion to dismiss.  
Undoubtedly, the circumstances of a given case may prevent a claim from 
reaching the requisite plausibility—and the facts of many cases will certainly 
make it difficult to survive summary judgement—but modern usage of PII and 
common law bailment principles lead one to conclude that commercial holders 
of PII may have a duty of reasonable care to protect that information against 
third-party criminal theft. 
At a broad level, this is a problem for the courts, not the legislature.  Despite 
the modernity of the problem, the solution is better vested in a system that 
adjudicates on a case-by-case basis and can therefore evaluate each case based 
on security standards that are reasonable at the time.  This is because in one 
sense, the data breach problem is more like an arms race than a bank robbery: a 
legislature may simply make theft illegal, but the nature of data theft and security 
is that methods and techniques are constantly evolving in response to one 
another, at a pace which neither the legislature nor an administrative agency can 
hope to match. 
Moreover, this is simply not a field where “one size fits all” security standards 
fairly asses when security is reasonable or not.  Firms collecting PII have varying 
levels of resources, store varying amounts and types of PII, and face different 
levels of threats.  Thus, what administrative agencies like the FTC might do 
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instead, for example, is study common data security practices that will help courts 
establish guidelines within which changing practices and technologies may fit. 
Therefore, it is far better that we instruct commercial holders of PII to 
exercise reasonable care when their possession of PII stems from a quasi-
bailment, and allow them to defend themselves on those terms if a breach occurs.  
Admittedly, this does not totally resolve the uncertainty that businesses face.  
What it does do, however, is bring uniformity and familiarity to how questions of 
negligent security will be addressed, while still allowing for the necessary 
flexibility in what those questions will be.  From the perspective of consumer 
class actions, this is a marked improvement. 
Indeed, the alternative seems to be a rigid statutory framework that inevitably 
fails, to the extent it tries, to mandate data security standards that are not one size 
fits all.  Under the proposals in this Note, the holder can present evidence 
rebutting the presumption of such an agreement, assert procedural defenses like 
standing and harm, and, of course, argue that their security measures were 
reasonable. 
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